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Abstract
We exploit homogeneous firm level data of manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors to study the impact of firing restrictions on job flow dynamics across 14 Eu-
ropean countries. We find that more stringent firing laws dampen the response of job
destruction to the cycle, thus making job turnover less counter-cyclical. Moreover,
the impact of firing costs on job creation and job destruction varies across sectors,
depending on sector-specific trend growth. Our findings clearly suggest that such
costs are more important in contracting than in growing sectors.
Keywords: Gross Job Flows, Europe, Business Cycle, Firing Costs
JEL Classification: J23, J63, J68.
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Non-technical summary 
 
A large empirical literature has looked at the patterns of job creation and job destruction using 
firm or establishment level data. A controversial stylized fact relates to the relationship between 
job turnover and the business cycle. While all studies report a pro-cyclical movement of job 
creation and a counter-cyclical movement of job destruction, the volatility of these two flows 
over the business cycle differs across countries. Estimates for the US, Canada and the UK 
typically show that the increase in job destruction during economic downturns tends to be 
stronger than the increase in job creation during upturns, resulting in counter-cyclical 
movements of job reallocation. By contrast, estimates for continental European countries 
present a less clear picture, with job reallocation tending to be a-cyclical or slightly pro-cyclical. 
 
Two alternative explanations have been proposed to explain these cross-country differences in 
job flow dynamics. The first relates them to differences in employment protection legislation 
(EPL). When searching for a job and establishing a profitable match between the firm 
requirements and worker characteristics takes time, job creation is time consuming, while job 
destruction is instantaneous. Thus, job reallocation is counter-cyclical. However, the presence of 
fixed adjustment costs associated with dismissals will slow down the process of job destruction, 
and might imply a-cyclical or even pro-cyclical movements of job reallocation. A competing 
explanation relies on differences in data coverage and sampling frame across studies. While 
evidence for the US, Canada and the UK is mostly based on establishment data for the 
manufacturing sector, studies for continental European countries typically rely on firm level 
data including manufacturing and service industries. It has been argued that the asymmetric 
behaviour of job creation and job destruction appears to be a peculiarity of the manufacturing 
sector. In service industries, the positive trend of employment growth might imply a higher 
variability of job creation over the business cycle, resulting in a pro-cyclical movement of job 
turnover. 
 
This paper contributes to the understanding of the role of EPL on labour market dynamics and 
examines differences and similarities in the cyclical patterns of job flows across countries and 
sectors. It overcomes previous problems of cross-country comparability of job flow dynamics 
by using a unique homogenous firm-level data set that covers the whole spectrum of productive 
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Our findings indicate that firing restrictions play a significant role in shaping the response of job 
flows to fluctuations in the business cycle, while sectoral characteristics are less important. The 
response of job destruction to economic downturns is weakened in countries where EPL is more 
stringent, resulting in less countercyclical or a-cyclical movements of job reallocation. A closely 
related result relates to the impact of EPL on the level of job turnover. Our findings clearly 
suggest that the expected negative impact of EPL on job turnover is weakened in sectors 
characterized by an expanding employment trend. Hence, we conclude arguing that failing to 
control for differences across countries in aggregate trend growth or the phase of the business 
cycle might miss an important element at the time of evaluating the impact of firing restrictions 
on employment dynamics. 
 
sectors for 14 European countries during the 1990s. Moreover, it presents a difference-in-
difference identification strategy that avoids the problems of lack of degrees of freedom 
typically encountered in the empirical macro literature when identifying the impact of labour 
market institutions.  
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1 Introduction
Following Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1990, 1992) seminal work, a large empirical litera-
ture has looked at the stylized facts of job creation and job destruction using firm or
establishment level data. A controversial stylized fact relates to the relationship between
job turnover and the business cycle. While all studies report a pro-cyclical movement of
job creation and a counter-cyclical movement of job destruction, the volatility of these
two flows over the business cycle diﬀers across countries. Estimates for the US, Canada
and the UK typically show that the increase in job destruction during economic down-
turns tends to be stronger than the increase in job creation during upturns, resulting in
counter-cyclical movements of job reallocation (the sum of job creation and job destruc-
tion).1 By contrast, estimates for continental European countries present a less clear
picture, with job reallocation tending to be a-cyclical or slightly pro-cyclical.2
In spite of this contrast, a number of models have been developed to capture the
apparent counter-cyclicality of job reallocation. Caballero and Hammour (1994) show,
within a vintage model of process and product innovation, that declines in demand are
only partly accommodated by a reduction of job creation when fast creation of jobs
in an industry is costly due to adjustment costs. As a consequence, job creation will
tend to be smoothed over the business cycle and job destruction will be concentrated
in recessions, implying a counter-cyclical pattern in job reallocation. In Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), counter-cyclical movements of job reallocation are generated by the
time required to establish a profitable job-worker match. Intuitively, during upturns it
takes time to fill in vacancies while during downturns job destruction occurs immediately.
Hence job turnover is counter-cyclical.
Garibaldi (1998) takes stock of the cross-country diﬀerences in job flow dynamics and
shows that extending the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) framework to allow for the
presence of fixed adjustment costs associated with dismissals can result in a-cyclical or
1See Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis et al. (1996) for the US manufacturing sector, Baldwin
at al. (1998) for Canada and Konings (1995) for the UK.
2 In particular, an a-cyclical pattern has been found in Austria (Stiglbauer et al., 2002), Italy (Contini
et al., 1995), Spain (Dolado and Gomez-Salvador, 1995) and Germany (Boeri and Cramer, 1992) while a
slightly pro-cyclical pattern has been documented for France (Lagarde et al., 1994) and Sweden (OECD,
1994).
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even pro-cyclical movements of job reallocation. In this setting, when firing is costly and
time-consuming the asymmetry in the cyclical pattern of job creation and job destruc-
tion disappears, as job destruction becomes less responsive to the cycle. Thus, Garibaldi
(1998) concludes that cross-country diﬀerences in job flow dynamics can be accounted
for by diﬀerences in the relative stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL).
A competing explanation of these cross-country patterns relies on diﬀerences in data
coverage and sampling frame across studies. While evidence for the US, Canada and
the UK is mostly based on establishment data for the manufacturing sector, studies for
continental European countries typically rely on firm level data including manufacturing
and service industries. Boeri (1996) and Foote (1998) claim that the asymmetric be-
havior of job creation and job destruction in US data appears to be a peculiarity of the
manufacturing sector. In service industries, the positive trend of employment growth im-
plies a higher variability of job creation over the business cycle, resulting in a pro-cyclical
movement of job turnover.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the role of EPL on labour market
dynamics. It overcomes previous problems of cross-country comparability of job flow dy-
namics by using a unique homogenous firm-level data set that covers the whole spectrum
of productive sectors for 14 European countries during the 1990s. Moreover, it presents
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence identification strategy that avoids the problems of lack of de-
grees of freedom typically encountered in the empirical macro literature when identifying
the impact of labour market institutions. Our findings indicate that firing restrictions
play a significant role in shaping the response of job flows to fluctuations in the busi-
ness cycle, while sectoral characteristics are less important. As suggested by Garibaldi
(1998), we find that firms facing tight firing restrictions smooth job destruction over the
business cycle. Hence, countries where EPL is more stringent present more pro-cyclical
job turnover in all productive sectors.
A closely related result relates to the impact of EPL on the level of job turnover.
From a theoretical perspective, EPL should reduce both job creation and job destruction
and therefore labour turnover.3 In spite of this unambiguous theoretical prediction, the
3See Bertola (1999) and the references therein.
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empirical cross-country evidence on the eﬀects of EPL on aggregate job flows presents
mixed results.4 Bertola and Rogerson (1997) argue that other institutions, notably
wage compression, are also present in tight EPL countries, thus counter-balancing the
eﬀects of firing restrictions on job flows. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) and Wolfers
(2005) argue instead that firing restrictions should aﬀect mostly short term employment
fluctuations having little impact on annual estimates of job flows. Indeed, they provide
evidence suggesting noticeable cross-country diﬀerences in labour market dynamics at
the quarterly or seasonal frequency, and relate them to firing restrictions. A third possible
explanation explored in this paper relates to diﬀerences in trend growth. Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) show that higher trend growth is expected to dampen the impact of firing
restrictions on job flows. Exploiting the sectoral nature of our data, our findings clearly
suggest that the expected negative impact of EPL on job turnover is weakened in sectors
characterized by an expanding employment trend. Thus, previous studies that failed
to control for diﬀerences across countries in aggregate trend growth or the phase of the
business cycle might have missed an important element at the time of evaluating the
impact of firing restrictions on employment dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the main charac-
teristics of the data and Section 3 sets out the empirical methodology. The main results
of the paper are presented in Section 4. Section 5 performs a series of robustness checks
and Section 6 draws some concluding remarks.
2 The data
Our main data source is Amadeus, a firm-level database collected by the Bureau van Dijk
(BvD) from balance sheet data in European countries.5 The information is collected by
the national Chambers of Commerce and homogenized by BvD applying uniform formats
to allow accurate cross-country comparisons. The period of analysis used for this study
spans from 1992 to 2001 depending on the country, and the sample includes all EU-15
4See OECD (2004) for a recent survey of the empirical literature.
5There are several versions of Amadeus, depending basically on the number of firms covered. Ours is
the top 1,000,000 firms.
countries plus Norway with the exception of Luxemburg and Ireland.
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Amadeus has several important advantages for the study of job flow dynamics across
countries. Previous studies usually suﬀer from diﬀerences across countries in the source of
the data (administrative versus survey), unit of observation (firms versus establishments),
sectoral coverage (manufacturing versus services), and period of observation (expansion
versus recessions), which may have led to misleading interpretations of the cross-country
cyclical patterns of job flows (OECD, 1994). Instead, in Amadeus the data collection
is relatively homogeneous across countries. Moreover, firms’ information is classified on
narrowly defined sectors (2-digit NACE classification) and data from both manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors are reasonably representative.
One limitation of Amadeus is that it does not allow one to accurately identify birth
and death of firms. Therefore we restrict our analysis to continuing firms, e.g. firms
that are in the sample for at least two consecutive periods. This is an important lim-
itation for the purpose of comparison of job turnover rates from Amadeus with other
sources. However, the exclusion of entry and exit should be less problematic at the time
of evaluating the impact of EPL on employment dynamics, because it is precisely job
turnover of continuing firms the component of total job turnover that is more likely to be
aﬀected by firing restrictions (OECD, 1999). A second limitation relates to the sampling
of Amadeus, which introduces a bias against very small firms.6 This is common in firm
level data sets, but is potentially important when measuring job flows since a relevant
fraction of job turnover occurs within this segment of the size distribution. Moreover,
in some countries firms below a certain size-threshold are exempted from firing restric-
tions.7 It could well be the case that firms more prone to labour turnover limit their
size to slightly below the threshold in order to avoid legislation.8 This sampling bias is
unlikely to aﬀect our results, as long as it remains relatively constant over time, since our
empirical strategy mostly relies on within country and sector comparisons by exploiting
the diﬀerential impact of EPL across diﬀerent phases of the business cycle.
6Typically, firms below 10 employees are excluded from the sample.
7For a rationale for such diﬀerential legislation see Boeri and Jimeno (2005).
8Evidence suggests that threshold eﬀects are present, although are quantitatively small. See Borgello
et al. (2002) and Schivardi and Torrini (2004) for a discussion of the Italian case.
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Gómez-Salvador et al. (2004) show that the sectoral distribution of employment in
Amadeus is very similar to the actual distribution of employment as measured by the
national labour force surveys (LFS). Perhaps most convincingly, employment growth
rates from Amadeus follow quite closely the growth rate of employment in the LFS,
suggesting that the sample in Amadeus is representative of the total firm’s population.
Figure 1 shows annual employment growth in 24 diﬀerent sectors and 14 countries as
measured in Amadeus, against employment growth measured in those sectors by STAN,
the Structural Analysis Database constructed by the OECD. We do not expect a perfect
correlation here, as Financial sectors and, more importantly, public employees are not
covered by Amadeus. However, the positive and significant association (corr. 0.45)
between both sources is reassuring.
There are several indices of employment protection in the literature. Our preferred
indicator is the most recent index developed by the OECD (2004), which ranges theoret-
ically from 0 to 6, and empirically from 0.5 to 3.5, according to the increasing strictness
of EPL. This is the most comprehensive index of EPL, covering several aspects of em-
ployment protection including regulation for individual and collective dismissals and
diﬀerences across regular and temporary contracts. An alternative measure of employ-
ment protection was first developed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and updated by
Nickell et al. (2005) and Gomez Salvador et al. (2004). This index is also scaled from 0
to 6 and in principle has the virtue of providing greater variability over time. However,
to a large extent this variability is due to the interpolation of previous measures. We
provide some robustness checks using this index below.
Job flow statistics from Amadeus are merged with employment and value added
data at the sectoral level from STAN. To this purpose, we construct annual job flow
statistics for 24 sectors, which are those covered in STAN. The advantage of STAN is
that it contains long time series of annual value added at the sectoral level, which we
use to construct a sectoral output gap indicator as our main measure of the business
cycle.9 In Section 5 we report robustness checks using employment growth measured by
9The output gap is constructed applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to value added series in each sector
over the period 1970-2002. Regressions using alternative output gap series obtained from a Band-Pass
filter over a window of 2 to 8 years yielded qualitatively similar results.
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STAN rather than the output gap as a measure of the cycle. Although often used in the
literature, the disadvantage of employment growth over the output gap indicator is that
the former is likely to be aﬀected by employment protection. Thus, our main focus will
be on the output gap as a measure of the business cycle.
3 Empirical model
We calculate yearly job creation (JC), job destruction (JD) and job reallocation (JR)
rates at the sectoral level for a total of 24 sectors. We follow the standard definitions
of job flow measures as described in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). JCijt in period t,
country j and sector i equals the weighted sum of employment gains over all growing
firms in sector i and country j between t − 1 and t. Similarly JDijt equals the sum of
employment losses (in absolute value) over all contracting firms between t− 1 and t. It
follows that net employment can be obtained as NETijt = JCijt − JDijt and the job
reallocation rate is defined as JRijt = JCijt + JDijt.
Our basic empirical strategy is based on the following reduced-form specification
JFijt = α+Nijtγ (1 + Fjtβ +Gijφ+ (Fjt ×Gij) δ) + (1)
+(Fjt ×Gij)ϕ+Gijθ +Dβ + μj + εijt
for i = 1, ..., 24 and j = 1, ..., 14
, where JFijt denotes job flows (job reallocation, job creation or job destruction depend-
ing on the specification), Nijt is a business cycle indicator, D is a set of sectoral and
time dummies, Fjt denotes for the index of employment protection legislation, Gij is the
sectoral trend employment growth (measured as the average net employment growth in
each sector over the sample period) and μj stands for a country fixed eﬀect.
The coeﬃcients of primary interest are γβ and γφ, which correspond to the inter-
action terms between the business cycle indicator and the EPL index on the one hand,
and sectoral trend growth on the other. When the dependent variable is JR, a positive
sign on γβ would support Garibaldi (1998) empirical hypothesis suggesting that more
stringent EPL increases the cyclicality of job turnover. Similarly, Foote (1998) result for
12
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the US would be confirmed by our sample of European countries if γφ > 0, suggesting
more pro-cyclical turnover in sectors experiencing higher trend growth. Note that we
further interact the EPL index with trend employment growth and allow for a triple
interaction of this term with the indicator of the cycle. Thus, we assess whether firing
costs may have a diﬀerent impact (on the cyclicality as well as on the level of job flows)
depending on the average trend growth in each sector.
In order to make inference about country patterns, we weight our regressions by the
relative number of employees in each cell with respect to the total number of employees
in the country. Thus, each country has equal weight in the final regressions.10
4 Empirical results
4.1 The cyclical properties of job reallocation
We start the analysis by illustrating the cyclical patterns of job turnover. Following
most of the literature, Table 1 shows Spearman correlations between job turnover and
the output gap indicator. The pooled correlations are reported for five diﬀerent groups:
all sectors, services, manufacturing, growing sectors (those whose average growth rate is
above the country average) and contracting sectors (those whose average growth rate is
below the country average).11 As noted before, the period of observation spans at most
between 1992-2001, and diﬀers across countries and sectors. Overall job reallocation is in
most cases a-cyclical with the clear exception of the United Kingdom and (perhaps more
surprisingly) Spain, where the correlation between job reallocation and the indicator of
10Alternatively, one may argue that cells constructed from a larger number of firm observations are
less likely to be aﬀected by noise, and thus more likely to be representative of the sectoral employment
dynamics. We have experimented with relative firm rather than employment weights in the regressions.
The results, available from the authors, are virtually unaﬀected by the weights used.
11The sectors are: Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Mining and quarrying; Food, beverages and
tobacco; Textiles; Wood products; Paper products, publishing and printing; Refined petroleum, nuclear
fuel and chemical products; Rubber and plastic products; Other non-metallic products; Basic metals
and fabricated metal products; Machinery and equipment; Electrical and optical equipment; Transport
equipment; Other manufacturing sectors; Electricity, gas and water supply; Construction; Wholesale and
retail trade, Repairs; Hotels and restaurants; Transport and communications; Financial intermediation
and insurance; Real estate and renting, Computer and related activities, Research and development;
Public Administration, defense and education; Health and social work; Other community, social and
personal services
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the cycle is negative and statistically significant.12 These correlations are in line with
previous studies, suggesting a-cyclical labour flows in continental Europe in contrast
with counter-cyclical patterns in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The cross-country diﬀer-
ences are even more apparent when comparing country averages within manufacturing
and services industries, or expanding and contracting sectors. With the sole exception
of Spain, job reallocation is a-cyclical or pro-cyclical in growing sectors, but either a-
cyclical or counter-cyclical in sectors with an average growth below the country mean.
A somewhat similar pattern arises if the distinction is made between service and man-
ufacturing sectors, the former group tending to present more pro-cyclical correlations.
In all columns, the UK presents a lower correlation between JR and the cycle. Indeed,
although diﬀerences across sectors are apparent, the ranking of countries is relatively
stable across the diﬀerent columns. Spearman pairwaise correlations across the groups
in the diﬀerent columns are always positive and statistically significant, suggesting the
importance of country eﬀects.
4.2 Job dynamics and firing restrictions
Can firing restrictions account for the cross-country diﬀerences in the cyclicality of job
turnover? Table 2 presents OLS estimates following equation 1 for JR. Column 1 includes
year and sectoral dummies, but excludes country dummies. According to this specifica-
tion, EPL has a direct negative impact on the level of job turnover, which is significant at
the 1% level. In line with Garibaldi (1998) theoretical predictions, the interaction term
Cycle ∗ EPL is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting
that JR is less counter-cyclical in the presence of firing restrictions. However, we do not
find significant diﬀerences in the cyclical patterns of JR in diﬀerent sectors depending on
their trend growth. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term Cycle∗TrendG is positive, in
line with Foote (1998) hypothesis, but far from standard levels of statistical significance.
Column 2 introduces country dummies into the regression. The main eﬀect of introduc-
12Spain is characterized by a relatively stringent EPL. However, there is evidence suggesting that this
legislation is to a large extent bypassed by the use of temporary employment contracts (Dolado et al.,
2002), whose incidence is the highest in Europe, resulting in higher job turnover (Gomez-Salvador et al,
2004). We examine this issue further below.
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ing country dummies is observed on the coeﬃcient of EPL, which retains its negative
sign but is now only significant at the 5% level. This is not surprising, given the little
information of the EPL index in the within variation of our short panel of countries. In
half of the countries considered there has been no changes in EPL legislation according to
our index, and only Italy presents more than one change in legislation during the sample
period. More importantly, the interaction term Cycle ∗ EPL is virtually unaﬀected by
the inclusion of country dummies, retaining its positive and statistically significant sign.
Columns 3 and 4 add to the list of controls a full set of Sector ∗ Y ear dummies, which
should account for any sector specific trends that might by confounded with the eﬀects
we want to capture here. Neither the EPL coeﬃcient nor its interaction with the cycle
are aﬀected by the inclusion of this set of dummies.
An interesting additional result refers to the diﬀerent role of employment protection
across sectors, depending on their trend growth. In all specifications presented in Table 2,
EPL∗TrendG presents a positive and statistically significant eﬀect. The interpretation
is quite intuitive, and requires to keep in mind the negative sign of EPL in the regressions.
Accordingly, the negative role of EPL on JR is less important in fast growing sectors. This
finding provides empirical support for models of adjustment costs featuring aggregate
as well as idiosyncratic shocks such as Bentolila and Bertola (1990), suggesting that
faster trend growth in a sector or country dampens the impact of firing cost on firm’s
hiring and firing decisions. Finally, note that the coeﬃcient of the triple interaction
Cycle ∗ EPL ∗ TrendG is never statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Tables 3 and 4 show estimates of eq. 1 for JC and JD respectively. As before, columns
(2) and (4) add country dummies to the baseline specification, while columns (3) and
(4) additionally include a full set of interactions between sectoral and year dummies.
We find a negative impact of EPL on the levels of JC and JD in all specifications,
but the coeﬃcients are only statistically significant when country dummies are excluded
from the regression. As regards the role of EPL on the cyclicality of these two flows,
the interaction term Cycle ∗EPL is always positive in JC and JD regressions, but only
statistically significant when JD is the dependent variable. This yields further support to
Garibaldi (1998) theoretical predictions, suggesting that the rate at which firms destroy
15
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obsolete jobs is less responsive to the cycle in countries with more stringent employment
protection legislation. Tables 3 and 4 yield further light into the role of trend growth
on the determination of job flows, and its interaction with employment protection. Note
first that, quite trivially, JC (JD) is higher (lower) in faster growing sectors as suggested
by the positive (negative) and statistically significant sign of TrendG in the regressions.
More interestingly, and consistently across all specifications, we find that the negative
impact of EPL in JC and JD is dampened in faster growing sectors, as the interaction
term EPL∗TrendG is always positive and statistically significant. Further, note that the
triple interaction Cycle∗EPL∗TrendG is not significant in JC, but presents a negative
and significant sign (only when country dummies are included) in the JD specifications.
The latter suggests that the stabilizing eﬀect of EPL on the cyclicality of JD is more
important in contracting than in growing sectors. Putting it diﬀerently, the negative
impact of EPL on JD is more important in contracting sectors (as suggested by the
positive coeﬀ. EPL ∗TrendG), and this eﬀect is reinforced during economic downturns.
In order to illustrate the magnitudes in the response of labour market flows to the
cycle for varying degrees of employment protection Figure 2 simulates the estimates
presented in the second column (including country dummies) of Table 2 for a sector with
the sample average growth. The thick line represents the actual response of the cyclical
behavior of JR to changes in EPL, and the light lines stand for 95 % confidence intervals.
According to this graph, JR would be counter-cyclical in a country like the UK (cycle
= 0.5) but a-cyclical in most continental European countries (whose EPL values are
typically larger than 2). Figures 3 and 5 replicate the analysis for JC and JD respectively,
thus simulating the estimates in column 2 of tables 3 and 4. They clearly show that JC
would be basically a-cyclical in the UK, while JD would by strongly counter-cyclical,
explaining the counter-cyclical pattern observed in JR. At the other extreme, JC would
be pro-cyclical and JD a-cyclical in the country with the most stringent EPL laws (e.g.
in Portugal where EPL = 3.7).
Our next set of graphs concentrates on the eﬀects of EPL on the levels of job flows,
rather than on their response to the cycle. As discussed above, the lack of variation
of EPL over time diﬃcults the interpretation of the main eﬀect of EPL when country
16
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dummies are included in the regression. However, our estimates of EPL are very similar
in magnitude in specifications with and without country dummies. The main eﬀect of
including country dummies lies on the eﬃciency of the estimates, as standard errors
almost double. Figure 5 presents simulations of the eﬀects of EPL on JR, JC and JD
as a function of the business cycle following the specification in column 1 of tables 2,
3 and 4, thus, excluding country dummies. A distinction is made between growing
(right hand side graphs) and contracting sectors (in the left hand side).13 As expected,
in contracting sectors EPL reduces job turnover, more significantly when the sector
experiences a recession than when the sector experiences an expansion. In contrast, the
impact of EPL on JR for expanding sectors is never significantly diﬀerent from zero.
A similar pattern is observed regarding JC and JD, with the only diﬀerence that the
negative impact of EPL on JC is virtually not aﬀected by the phase of the business
cycle. Our estimates thus suggest that the negative association between EPL and job
flows is stronger in sectors experiencing negative trend growth, but might not be visible
in expanding sectors or during expansionary periods. Figure 4 present the graphs of the
specifications including country dummies (column 2 in tables 2, 3 and 4). Confidence
bands grow larger here, and the negative eﬀect of EPL on JC is never statistically
significant. However, we still find a negative and significant eﬀect of EPL on JD and
JR flows within contracting sectors, which weakens as we move from a recession into an
expansion.
5 Robustness Checks
In this section we present a number of robustness checks of the main results presented
above. Due to length restrictions, we focus on job reallocation. We first check for the
robustness of the results with respect to alternative measures of employment protection
and the business cycle. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 we present our baseline estimates
(Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) for the EPL measure developed by Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000) and extended by Gómez-Salvador et al. (2004). The new measure yields a negative
13 In the two simulations the eﬀect of EPL on job flows has been evaluated at the mean employment
growth rate of contracting (trendG ≤ 0) and expanding sectors (trendG > 0).
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coeﬃcient on the EPL level that is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level even in the presence of country dummies. Similarly, the interaction terms Cycle ∗
EPL and EPL ∗ TrendG are positive and statistically significant at standard levels in
both specifications. Columns 3 and 4 show that our results are not much aﬀected by
the measure of the cycle. We return here to our preferred measure of EPL, but use
employment growth instead of the output gap as a cycle measure. The interaction term
Cycle∗EPL is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, EPL
and EPL∗TrendG retain their expected signs, but are only statistically significant when
country dummies are excluded from the regression. Finally, columns 5 and 6 shows that
our main results are unaﬀected when we combine the new EPL variable with employment
growth as a cycle measure.
We explore next the sensitivity with respect to the number of sectors and countries
included in the regressions. While our empirical strategy is expected to suﬀer less from
this factor than standard cross-country regressions, it might still be the case that some
of our results are driven by the inclusion of some specific country or sector. Our strategy
follows Sala-i-Martin (1997) but focusing on the number of countries and sectors included
in the regression rather than on the set of control variables. Very briefly, we look at the
distribution of the coeﬃcients of interest across the full set of regressions that result from
dropping any combinations of three countries (or sectors) in our baseline specification
(Column 2 in Table 1). Taking into account that the full sample of countries (sectors) is
14 (24), the resulting number of regressions is 560 (2600). We take next the averages of
the estimated coeﬃcients and their standard deviations across the diﬀerent regressions.
Under the assumption of normality, these two statistics are suﬃcient to calculate the
cumulative distributive function (CDF ) of the estimates and apply standard confidence
levels. However, even if the estimates in every regression follow a t-Student distribution,
it might be the case that the distribution of the estimates is not normal. Following
Sala-i-Martin (1997), in this case we can still compute their CDF as the average of the
individual cumulative distributive functions.
The first part of Table 6 shows the eﬀects of changing the number of countries on our
baseline results. Independently of the normality assumption, the null of each coeﬃcient
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equal to zero would be rejected at the 5 percent level in the two cases of primary interest:
Cycle∗EPL and EPL∗TrendG. Even EPL maintains its negative sign and significance
at the 5 percent level, quite a surprising result taking into account that country dummies
are present in the regression. A similar result is obtained in the second part of the table,
which clearly shows that the number of sectors included in the regressions does not alter
the main message of our baseline specification.
Our final set of robustness checks concentrates on the possible role of competing
factors. Gómez-Salvador et al. (2004) find a negative impact of unemployment ben-
efits, union coordination and the tax wedge on the level of JR within a cross-country
framework. Other institutional indicators included in the analysis are the incidence of
temporary contracts and the generosity of employment subsidies. In principle, we have
no reasons to expect any of these institutions to have a role on the determination of
the cyclical behavior of job flows, with the possible exception of temporary contracts.
Temporary contracts might replace permanent employment when the latter is heavily
protected by firing restrictions. Thus, we might expect that a higher incidence of tem-
porary contracts counter-balances the positive role of EPL on the cyclical behavior of
JR.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 present a full set of interactions between labour market
institutions and the cycle variable. The set of institutional variables includes the EPL
index, an index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, the tax wedge, the share of
temporary contracts in total employment and the generosity of employment subsidies.14
Hence, it adds all institutional variables considered in Gómez-Salvador et al. (2004)
with the exception of union coordination, which is time invariant within the sample
period. The first aspect worth noting is that the interaction term Cycle∗EPL is positive
14The index of the duration of unemployment benefits (OECD, 2001) is defined as a weighted average
of benefits received during the second, third and fifth year of unemployment divided by the benefits in
the first year of unemployment. It ranges from 0 (if benefit provision stops after 1 year) to 1 (for a
constant benefit after 5 years). The tax wedge (Nickell et al., 2001) between the real (monetary) labour
cost faced by the firms and the consumption wage received by the employees is calculated as the sum
of employment tax rate, the direct tax rate and inderect tax rate normalized by GDP. The indicator of
temporary contracts is the share of workers holding temporary contracts in the total number of employees
at the ISIC-1 sectoral level (source: LFS). The sectoral employment subsidies indicator is the share of
sectoral and ad hoc state aid as a percentage of GDP (source: Eurostat).
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and statistically significant in both specifications, thus confirming our previous results.
Contrary to our expectations Cycle ∗ Temp is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. A
possible reason is that temporary contracts act only on the cyclicality of job flows through
its complementarity with employment protection. Hence, once EPL is accounted for they
have no role in the determination of JR. As expected, other institutions do not seem to
aﬀect the cyclicality of JR, with the exception of the somewhat puzzling negative and
significant (at the 10% level when country dummies are present) eﬀect of employment
subsidies. Gómez-Salvador et al. (2004) find a negative eﬀect of employment subsidies
on JD, which is partially compensated by a positive (although non significant) impact on
JC. Our results seem to indicate that the reduction of JD due to employment subsidies is
more important during economic upturns. Columns 3 and 4 add the interactions between
institutional variables and trend growth.15 Note that their inclusion does not alter the
positive and significant coeﬃcient of Cycle ∗ EPL. The interaction of EPL ∗ TrendG
is positive and statistically significant, but is not robust to the inclusion of country
dummies, while the impact of the remaining institutional variables (with the exception
again of employment subsidies) on JR does not seem to be aﬀected by sectoral trend
growth.
6 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the impact of employment protection legislation (EPL) on the
cyclicality of job turnover using comparable sectoral firm level data for 14 European
countries. Our data set overcomes previous problems of comparability of job flow statis-
tics, and allows to extend the analysis of employment dynamics to manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sectors. Our novel empirical strategy does not suﬀer from the small
sample problems typically encountered in cross-country studies, since we focus on the
impact EPL has on the employment adjustment in diﬀerent sectors and phases of the
business cycle.
15The triple interactions Institution ∗ Cycle ∗ TrendG were never found significantly diﬀerent from
zero, and thus are excluded from the regression.
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We find that EPL induces a positive co-movement of job turnover with diﬀerent
indicators of the cycle. This positive co-movement is mainly driven by the behavior
of job destruction. In line with theoretical predictions, we show that firing restrictions
dampen the volatility of job destruction during the cycle, having a milder eﬀect on job
creation. These results are statistically significant and robust to diﬀerent specifications
including country, sectoral and time eﬀects. Moreover, the simulations presented in the
paper show that the eﬀects of firing restrictions on employment dynamics are large in
magnitude, being able to account for observed cross-country patterns in the cyclicality
of job flows.
Our estimates further suggest that the negative impact of EPL on job turnover is
closely related to trend growth in the sector. Accordingly, firms in fast growing sectors
appear less aﬀected by firing costs, displaying higher job creation and job destruction.
Our results have potentially important policy implications. Understanding the be-
havior of gross job flows over the cycle and its determinants is fundamental for the
assessment of the extent and need for stabilization policies. In line with an abundant
theoretical literature, our findings strongly suggest a role for EPL in stabilizing employ-
ment fluctuations, which in the absence of better insurance mechanisms against labour
income risk might be taken into account when evaluating alternative structural reforms.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Spearman Correlations between job reallocation and cycle
All sectors Services Manufacturing Growing Contracting
Austria 0.018 0.186 -0.064 0.061 -0.136
Belgium -0.059 -0.101 -0.067 -0.031 -0.099
Denmark 0.003 0.117 -0.054 0.071 -0.177
Finland 0.001 0.000 0.127 0.019 -0.415*
France 0.115 0.014 0.042 0.059 0.223
Germany 0.165* 0.197 -0.010 0.281* -0.048
Greece 0.192* 0.365* 0.073 0.235* -0.297
Italy -0.102 0.038 -0.063 -0.100 0.067
Netherlands -0.049 0.278* -0.112 -0.012 -0.077
Norway -0.109 0.175 -0.148 -0.132 -0.261
Portugal 0.129 0.155 0.232 0.064 0.089
Spain -0.136* -0.317* 0.061 -0.160* -0.326*
Sweden -0.110 0.137 -0.092 -0.106 -0.255
UK -0.225* 0.081 -0.286* -0.123 -0.418*
Note: * denotes significant at the 5 percent level. The table shows the response of job reallocation
to the output gap across diﬀerent groups, pooling the data from all sectors belonging to each
group. The data are yearly observations for a total of 24 sectors, for the period (depends on
the country) 1992-2001. For a definition of the sectors see Footnote 11. Growing (contracting)
sectors are those whose average growth rate is above (below) the country average.
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Table 2: Employment protection and the cyclical behavior of job reallocation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JR JR JR JR
Cycle -0.169 -0.176 -0.183 -0.191
(2.55)* (2.74)** (2.53)* (2.73)**
EPL -0.619 -0.806 -0.661 -0.871
(3.78)** (1.96)* (3.84)** (2.06)*
Cycle ∗ EPL 0.060 0.061 0.066 0.068
(2.03)* (2.05)* (2.14)* (2.12)*
Cycle ∗ TrendG 0.001 0.021 -0.002 0.020
(0.08) (1.29) (0.09) (1.08)
Cycle ∗ EPL ∗ TrendG -0.001 -0.006 0.000 -0.005
(0.14) (0.85) (0.01) (0.69)
EPL ∗ TrendG 0.173 0.112 0.188 0.122
(4.17)** (2.79)** (4.25)** (2.84)**
TrendG 0.153 0.014 0.114 -0.016
(1.37) (0.13) (0.97) (0.14)
Intercept 11.958 10.098 9.275 8.039
(12.13)** (7.13)** (12.18)** (4.57)**
Country Dummy No Yes No Yes
Sector ∗ year Dummy No No Yes Yes
Observations 2080 2080 2080 2080
R2 0.40 0.46 0.44 0.50
Note: Robust standard errors. t-statistics in parenthesis. * and ** denote significant at the 5 and
1 percent level respectively. All the specifications include time dummies and industry dummies.
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Table 3: Employment protection and the cyclical behavior of job creation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JC JC JC JC
Cycle -0.025 -0.032 -0.047 -0.054
(0.58) (0.76) (1.06) (1.23)
EPL -0.350 -0.361 -0.391 -0.459
(3.50)** (1.21) (3.77)** (1.56)
Cycle ∗ EPL 0.014 0.017 0.021 0.023
(0.77) (0.87) (1.07) (1.15)
Cycle ∗ TrendG -0.022 -0.009 -0.022 -0.009
(1.81) (0.80) (1.57) (0.67)
Cycle ∗ EPL ∗ TrendG 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005
(1.56) (1.04) (1.38) (0.93)
EPL ∗ TrendG 0.107 0.059 0.122 0.071
(3.81)** (2.03)* (3.99)** (2.25)*
TrendG 0.500 0.497 0.453 0.451
(6.28)** (5.94)** (5.38)** (5.06)**
Intercept 5.319 3.899 4.085 3.038
(8.43)** (3.97)** (3.99)** (2.02)*
Country Dummy No Yes No Yes
Sector ∗ year Dummy No No Yes Yes
Observations 2080 2080 2080 2080
R2 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.63
Note: Robust standard errors. t-statistics in parenthesis. * and ** denote significant at the 5 and
1 percent level respectively. All the specifications include time dummies and industry dummies.
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Table 4: Employment protection and the cyclical behavior of job destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JD JD JD JD
Cycle -0.179 -0.172 -0.159 -0.157
(4.45)** (4.28)** (3.73)** (3.66)**
EPL -0.330 -0.244 -0.316 -0.200
(3.59)** (0.58) (3.32)** (0.45)
Cycle ∗ EPL 0.055 0.054 0.051 0.051
(3.22)** (3.10)** (2.88)** (2.83)**
Cycle ∗ TrendG 0.022 0.035 0.017 0.033
(2.04)* (3.30)** (1.40) (2.69)**
Cycle ∗ EPL ∗ TrendG -0.007 -0.012 -0.006 -0.012
(1.66) (2.87)** (1.27) (2.50)*
EPL ∗ TrendG 0.088 0.061 0.083 0.053
(3.72)** (2.66)** (3.32)** (2.14)*
TrendG -0.356 -0.493 -0.339 -0.475
(5.59)** (8.22)** (5.08)** (7.36)**
Intercept 6.753 5.777 4.880 4.612
(12.71)** (4.41)** (10.56)** (3.69)**
Country Dummy No Yes No Yes
Sector ∗ year Dummy No No Yes Yes
Observations 2080 2080 2080 2080
R2 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.34
Note: Robust standard errors. t-statistics in parenthesis. * and ** denote significant at the 5 and
1 percent level respectively. All the specifications include time dummies and industry dummies.
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Table 5: Robustness check. Alternative EPL and cycle measures
Cycle Indicator: Output Gap Employment Growth Employment Growth
EPL variable: GS (2004) OECD 2004 GS (2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
JR JR JR JR JR JR
Cycle -0.169 -0.168 -0.308 -0.319 -0.246 -0.268
(2.80)** (2.89)** (3.22)** (3.54)** (2.85)** (3.31)**
EPL -0.607 -1.996 -0.591 -0.657 -0.572 -1.795
(4.04)** (3.24)** (3.73)** (1.56) (3.92)** (3.01)**
Cycle ∗EPL 0.059 0.058 0.117 0.117 0.092 0.095
(2.20)* (2.14)* (2.57)* (2.68)** (2.18)* (2.36)*
Cycle ∗ TrendG 0.012 0.028 0.061 0.070 0.065 0.081
(0.81) (1.80) (1.86) (2.27)* (2.16)* (2.92)**
Cycle ∗EPL ∗ TrendG 0.127 0.059 0.173 0.067 0.109 0.072
(1.24) (0.58) (1.40) (0.53) (1.00) (0.63)
EPL ∗ TrendG -0.005 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.019
(0.82) (1.30) (1.07) (1.25) (1.30) (1.68)
TrendG 0.177 0.092 0.142 0.070 0.162 0.068
(4.75)** (2.45)* (3.12)** (1.42) (4.03)** (1.50)
Intercept 11.871 13.684 12.240 10.155 12.105 13.518
(12.34)** (7.13)** (11.96)** (7.07)** (12.06)** (7.14)**
Country Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sector ∗ year Dummy No No No No No No
Observations 2080 2080 2098 2098 2098 2098
R2 0.40 0.46 0.41 0.47 0.41 0.47
Note: Robust standard errors. t-statistics in parenthesis. * and ** denote significant at the 5 and
1 percent level respectively. All the specifications include time dummies and industry dummies.
GS (2004) refers to Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004)
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Table 6: Robustness check. Sensitivity with respect to the number of countries and
sectors included in the regression
Combining Countries (560 regressions)
Mean s.d CDFN CDFNN
Cycle -0.185 0.077 0.99 0.99
EPL -0.790 0.491 0.95 0.91
Cycle ∗EPL 0.063 0.034 0.97 0.96
Cycle ∗ TrendG 0.023 0.021 0.86 0.85
TrendG 0.033 0.133 0.60 0.66
Cycle ∗EPL ∗ TrendG -0.006 0.008 0.78 0.76
EPL ∗ TrendG 0.105 0.049 0.98 0.95
Combining Sectors (2600 regressions)
Cycle -0.177 0.068 1.00 0.99
EPL -0.800 0.440 0.97 0.96
Cycle ∗EPL 0.062 0.032 0.97 0.97
Cycle ∗ TrendG 0.021 0.018 0.88 0.87
TrendG 0.019 0.116 0.56 0.65
Cycle ∗EPL ∗ TrendG -0.006 0.007 0.78 0.77
EPL ∗ TrendG 0.110 0.043 0.99 0.99
Note: Robust standard errors. t-statistics in parenthesis. All the specifications include time
dummies, industry and country dummies. The results refer to all the regressions resulting from
droping any combinations of 3 countries (first part of the table) or 3 sectors (second part of
the table) in the specification presented in Table 2, Column 2. CDFN : cumulative distributive
function under normality assumption. CDFNN: cumulative distributive function under non-
normality assumption
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Table 7: The role of other labor market institutions in the determination of job turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JR JR JR JR
Cycle -0.138 -0.129 -0.153 -0.151
(0.85) (0.81) (0.94) (0.94)
Cycle ∗ TrendG 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.011
(0.73) (1.16) (0.99) (1.34)
TrendG 0.571 0.576 0.396 0.392
(8.17)** (7.48)** (1.24) (1.28)
Cycle ∗EPL 0.148 0.111 0.149 0.115
(2.92)** (2.34)* (3.04)** (2.47)*
EPL -0.296 -0.569 -0.782 -0.917
(1.09) (0.90) (2.17)* (1.36)
Cycle ∗ Temp 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.71) (0.62) (0.85) (0.77)
Temp 0.031 0.077 0.016 0.056
(1.23) (1.95) (0.26) (0.83)
Cycle ∗Benefits 0.130 0.093 0.145 0.110
(1.23) (0.94) (1.40) (1.10)
Unemployment Benefits -2.047 -10.257 -2.438 -10.055
(3.90)** (4.94)** (2.80)** (4.62)**
Cycle ∗ TaxWedge -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.93) (0.69) (1.00) (0.74)
TaxWedge -0.006 -0.244 -0.007 -0.254
(0.34) (4.43)** (0.29) (4.33)**
Subsidies ∗ Cycle -0.231 -0.175 -0.217 -0.163
(2.13)* (1.78) (2.13)* (1.72)
Employment Subsidies -0.660 -0.572 0.530 0.169
(1.14) (0.75) (0.71) (0.20)
EPL ∗ TrendG 0.166 0.111
(2.05)* (1.43)
Temp ∗ TrendG 0.005 0.007
(0.61) (0.90)
Benefits ∗ TrendG 0.150 0.109
(0.74) (0.53)
TaxWedge ∗ TrendG 0.000 0.002
(0.05) (0.30)
Subsidies ∗ TrendG -0.419 -0.326
(2.43)* (1.86)
Intercept 12.044 26.215 12.689 26.962
(9.75)** (6.35)** (6.80)** (6.35)**
T ime ∗ Sector Dummy No No No No
Country Dummy No Yes No Yes
Observations 1972 1972 1972 1972
R2 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.46
Note: Robust standard errors. t-statistics in parenthesis. * and ** denote significant at the 5 and
1 percent level respectively. All the specifications include time dummies and industry dummies.
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Figure 1: Sectoral Employment Growth. STAN vs. AMADEUS
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Figure 2: The cyclicality of Job Reallocation and EPL
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Figure 3: The cyclicality of JC and JD and EPL
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Figure 4: The response of job flows to changes in EPL as a function of the business cycle
when country dummies are excluded
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Figure 5: The response of job flows to changes in EPL as a function of the business cycle
controlling for country eﬀects
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